This paper investigates the networked evolutionary model based on snow-drift game with the strategy of rewards and penalty. Firstly, by using the semi-tensor product of matrices approach, the mathematical model of the networked evolutionary game is built. Secondly, combined with the matrix expression of logic, the mathematical model is expressed as a dynamic logical system and next converted into its evolutionary dynamic algebraic form. Thirdly, the dynamic evolution process is analyzed and the final level of cooperation is discussed. Finally, the effects of the changes in the rewarding and penalty factors on the level of cooperation in the model are studied separately, and the conclusions are verified by examples.
Introduction
Cooperation widely exists in various complex systems from biological to economic and social networks. Cooperative behavior is regarded as a key factor in the evolution process. So research on cooperation has great significance for group development. In recent years, with the development of network research and the innovation of experimental results, cooperation has been combined with different networks in different disciplines. As a new field from the classical games, evolutionary game theory provides an important and effective theoretical framework for the study on the evolution of cooperation between competing individuals.
To convert the strategy profile dynamics of the evolutionary game into a logi-evolutionary games [5] [6] [7] [8] , in this paper, we use semi-tensor product of matrices method to study the networked evolutionary model of snow-drift game with rewarding and penalty strategy. Different from the traditional snowdrift game, this paper introduces the strategy of rewards and punishment, which gives certain rewards to the cooperators, while the defectors need to deduct part of the payoffs. Then based on the theoretical basis of replication dynamics, we can determine the quantitative relationship between parameters. Through the strategy updating rules [9] , the dynamic process of networked evolutionary games can be expressed into a logical dynamic system, and finally converted into an algebraic form. On this basis, we discuss the final level of cooperation.
The composition of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we give some preliminary knowledge, including semi-tensor product of the matrices, networked evolutionary game and replication dynamics. Section 3 discusses the dynamic model of networked evolution based on the snow-drift game. In Section 4, we use specific examples to discuss the ultimate level of cooperation among the players in the game, which is followed by a brief conclusion in Section 5.
Preliminaries

The Semi-Tensor Product of Matrices
For statement ease, we first introduce some notations: , the semi-tensor product of two matrices A and B can be denoted as: Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics
where α is the least common multiple of , n p , ⊗ is the tensor product of the matrix, that is Kronecker product which can be denoted as:
, then the K-product of A and B is defined as follows:
, ,
Considering the multi-valued logical function [7] 
.
Using the notation, we have 
where
Networked Evolutionary Games
Definition 2.3: [2] A basic networked evolutionary game ( ) ( ) , , , N E G Π consists of three parts: The network used in this paper is an undirected cycle graph, and the degree of each node is the same 2, so the cycle graph n S is as Figure 1 .
Definition 2.4: [2] ij C refers to the payoff between i and j, so that the overall payoff of player i can be expressed as:
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This paper mainly use the strategy updating rules of unconditional imitation, as follows: The strategy of player i at time ( ) ( ) ( )
When the player with the best payoff is not unique,
Replication Dynamics
Consider that in a homogenized population, each individual can play with all other individuals in the population. Each pair of individuals proceeds in accordance
Assume that the proportion of individuals using a cooperative strategy is x, and the proportion of people who choose to become a defector is y. The benefits of cooperator/defector in the population are:
According to replication dynamics: The rate of changing a strategy in a population is proportional to the proportion of individuals using this strategy and their benefits:
According to the above formula, the nonlinear differential equation is closely related to the parameters of the payoff matrix. Considering the different characteristics of dynamics, we can discuss the following four situations separately:
• Defection dominates (D dominated C): T R P S > > > , the individual benefits of defectors are better than those cooperators, such as Prisoner's Dilemma;
• Coexistence (C and D coexist): T R S P > > > , at this time, cooperation and defection are in a symbiotic state, such as snow-drift game and Hawk-Dove game;
• Bistable situation (C and D are bistable): R T P S > > > , at this time, the player's optimal strategy is to be consistent with the opponent: choosing cooperation or defection at the same time, such as: Stag Hunt Game;
• Cooperation dominates (D dominated C): When T R < and P S < , no matter how the opponent chooses, the cooperative strategy is better than the defective strategy.
Model
Model Description
In the traditional snow-drift game, there are two strategies for the players to choose from: cooperation and defection. Considering that in a snowy night, the two men drive in opposite directions and are obstructed by the same snowdrift.
Assuming that the cost of removing the snowdrifts to make the roads smooth is c, the benefits of smooth roads for everyone are b, b c > . The cost of shoveling snow is evenly shared by cooperative snow shoveler. In this process, those who do not contribute are defector, and in order to promote the player to cooperate, we propose such a setting: If someone chooses to cooperate, then the cooperator can gain additional profits β , while the defector will be deducted the proceeds γ . When all the people choose to cooperate, they can get additional benefits α , so the original snowdrift model mutates into a mutated snow-drift game model with rewarding and penalty strategy. In order to better understand the framework model, we give the payoff bi-matrix in Table 1 (where C means "cooperate" and D means "defect"):
xP yP xP x P ϕ = + = + − , the cooperator's replicator dynamical equation is:
According to the different characteristics of the dynamics, when the game is judged as a variation of the snow-drift game, there is the following inequality relationship: 
Algebraic Formulation
In (7) 
We calculate the basic evolutionary equation for any node. In the cycle n S , Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics the neighborhood of node i is recorded as: 
x t x t x t x t x t M x t i N
where i f M ′ is the structural matrix obtained by the players by adopting an evolutionary strategy that imitates his neighbor's, ( ) ( ) ( )
. n x t x t x t x t =  From the formula (4) and the above formula, we have the algebraic form of the evolutionary dynamics as:
is called the transition matrix of the game.
Final Level of Cooperation
Based on the calculation methods for 
This formula show that if the player first choose the strategy to cooperate, eventually they maintain the cooperative strategy, and conversely, if the player first choose the strategy is uncooperative, and eventually they will maintain defection like first.
The matrix G M is the transition matrix of the game. Assuming any initial
We have
Next we discuss G, we can assume that Table   2 .
The basic evolutionary equation can be figured out as in Table 3 .
Then according to the strategy updating rules of unconditional imitation, the situation at time t is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
t f x t x t x t x t M x t x t x t x t i
Now we have the dynamic situation as
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
[ ] . In other words, if the initial strategy of the four players is one of the following, they will eventually choose the cooperative strategy:
From this, we can conclude that the final situation of maintaining cooperation accounts for 5 16 of the original total situations.
Parameter Discussion
Based on the above, we can know that there are two conditions to promote cooperation: • 2 R S T + ≥ , when the status of two neighbors of a cooperator is cooperation and defection, and the two neighbors of a defector are all cooperators, if the cooperators benefits is greater than or equal to the defectors, the strategy chosen by the player will be biased towards the cooperation. At this time, we can achieve the purpose of promoting cooperation. That is 
That is, if the initial strategy of the four players is one of the following situations, they will eventually choose to cooperate: 
The practical significance of this result is: when we improve the reward factor α , the proportion of the profile that ultimately maintains cooperation improves to 11 16 . The probability of cooperation has been greatly increased by increasing the benefits of cooperation.
• Secondly, changing the value of β , we can get 1 β ≥ from condition 1 and 0.8 β > from condition 2, so we take 0.9 β = . At this time, the payoff bi-matrix is as 
( ) Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics
We can see that compared with the original, the proportion of the profile that ultimately maintains cooperation has increased to 7 16 . That is to say, when one player chooses to cooperate and the other chooses to defect, increasing the reward of the cooperator can promote the proportion of cooperation.
• Thirdly, changing the value of γ , from condition 1 we can get 0.5 γ ≥ and 0.6 γ > from condition 2, so we take 0.5 γ = , and the payoff bi-matrix is in 
At first when one of two players choose to cooperate and the other does not cooperate, we can increase the punishments to reduce the gains of the defector.
In the end, the proportion of the situation that maintaining cooperation has increased to 11 16 , and it has also achieved the purpose of promoting cooperation. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the networked evolutionary model based on snow-drift game with rewarding and penalty strategy. By using semi-tensor product of matrices approach, the mathematical model of the networked evolutionary game is expressed as a dynamic logical system and next converted into its evolutionary dynamic algebraic form. Based on the form, many properties of the games evolutionary dynamics have been revealed. We have found the following interesting result: when the rewards for cooperators and the punishment for defectors are increased, that will promote the players to cooperate. But there are still many problems worth studying in our model and conclusion.
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